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The purpose of this empirical study is to analyze the relationship between financial institutions and 
performance in times of external crisis and evaluate whether there is a difference in performance between 
bank models; Islamic (IBs) and conventional (CBs). Egypt surrounding the Arab Spring event (2009-2013) is 
taken as a case study, comparing 6 conventional banks and 3 Islamic banks. Financial ratio analysis is the 
main method employed, allowing performance to be measured by efficiency, capital adequacy, profitability, 
solvency, liquidity, and credit risk. Due to the small sample sizes, normality in the distribution cannot be 
assumed and so the nonparametric rank order Mann-Whitney U test was employed to assess the significance 
of the results of the ratio analysis as well as effect size analysis of the strength of association between the two 
samples performance. Results of the financial ratio analysis show overall, CBs have superior performance in 
all performance indicators examined other than with Cost-Income and NIM. With progression nearing and 
through the crisis event period, efficiency performance for both bank models were equally volatile and stable, 
while IBs were able to increase capital adequacy and solvency performance during the crisis. IBs profitability 
was significantly negatively impacted by the crisis, other than related to NIM, while CBs increased 
profitability rates. IBs liquidity performance worsened and then improved midway through the crisis while 
CBs stabilized liquidity rates. Lastly, IBs were able to improve credit risk performance midway through the 
crisis period while CBs declined midway. Results of the nonparametric tests hold these observed differences 
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The topic of my capstone project revolves around increasing my understanding of the field of Islamic or 
Shariah-compliant finance, relating to my concentration in finance – but at the same time coinciding with my 
major in international business and minor in political science. My interest in the subject stems from my 
academic background, but also from my personal background, as my family is from Pakistan - where Islamic 
financing is used extensively. Herein I have always had a personal interest in learning the differences between 
conventional banking methods and those employed by Islamic financial institutions as a dual citizen of 
Pakistan and the United States. My additional choice of focusing on Islamic banking’s role in Egypt during 
the Arab Spring crisis rather than on Pakistan is my interest in answering a question I feel has not been 
attempted by research in the field to date, which is the effect of the crisis on the potential difference in 
performance across bank model within a nation – as I feel Pakistan does not have just one critical time period 
to look at to be able to draw similar conclusions. Alongside this, from my own knowledgeability of the events 
in this region since the onset of this still current financial and political crisis and availability of data, this 
country during the Arab uprising presents an applicable sample to ideally answer this question.  
 
The purpose of this project is thus to look at how financial and political crises effects financial institutions 
like banks. I hope to in the end be able to assess how internally banks are able to handle external crises – 
based off their different foundational goals. This is significant, as prior to research I already know Islamic 
banks are intrinsically different from other or western banking systems in that they run through a profit-loss 
sharing system. And with this, I hope to learn the differences between Islamic and conventional banking 
regarding their services and products, and why these differences are relevant. The relevance or value of this 
project is to contribute to growing literature in the field evaluating the performance of banks amidst crisis 
while addressing the limits of past research.  
 
There have been studies with comparable methodology and scope, though most focus on profitability, and do 
not look in depth at each variable of performance over the course of a crisis with the Arab Spring period. 
Research looks at other metrics too, such as efficiency, and employ models and statistical analysis that cannot 
be applied to this sample – and so this study attempts to branch off of past pursuits by applying a different 
methodology with the use of nonparametric statistics – while increasing my own understanding of this field 
of statistics in the process. Other studies look at only Islamic banks in multiple countries during a given time 
period, and so cannot take into account country specific conditions or the relationship to non-Islamic bank 
performance.  
 
The worth of this project is to establish a true picture of the financial health or position of financial 
institutions amidst crises – by taking Egypt during the Arab Spring as a case study. Conclusions that can be 
drawn from such a project are important to not only depositors and shareholders, but to managers and 
regulators of both types of institutions – and can help drive key institutional decisions and policies made in 
response or anticipation to external crises. This is substantial as financial institutions play a key role in 
economies as they provide the necessary funds to drive growth and development.  
 
In order to answer this question, financial ratio analysis is performed on the Egyptian financial statement data 
from FactSet to analyze the trends of each bank model relative to each other as well as across time. This will 
allow for discussion on the variation of the impact of the crisis on each internal determinant or variable of 
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performance. The nonparametric test of rank order with the Mann-Whitney U test is performed to determine 
the significance of the results obtained through the ratio analysis and whether they can be generalized for 
these two population samples. The study ends with a discussion of the implications of our results from both 
parts of the analysis.  
 
Literature Review 
In today’s financially global environment, it is nearly impossible to work without encountering other manners 
of banking, and it is just as important when evaluating one’s own system and bank model to remain 
innovative as well as concurrent to whatever issues may press one’s own organization and larger economy. In 
this comes the importance in understanding the backgrounds and principles of both bank models evaluated in 
this research paper, as well as to establish the connection and relevance of the effects of external crisis on 
these differing banking structures. Already there have been various studies done in the realm of Islamic 
finance that either explore the significance of a wide range of internal and external variables on bank 
performance or focus in on certain indicators of financial ratio analysis like profitability – and both were 
looked at in order to complete this unique research project.  
 
Without looking too deep into his theological presentation behind Islamic banking’s foundation, Hassan 
(2007) is still able to present a great compilation of the key operating differences that Islamic banks equip 
against competing non-Islamic financial institutions. He summarizes Islamic banks rely on a combination of 
three key principles; sharing, leasing, and sale – which is how funds have to essentially be channeled through. 
In contrast, the financial transactions and profit of conventional banks are built on interest and the debtor-
lender relationship. Islamic institutions also share an extra layer of corporate governance with Sharia boards 
to monitor their religious adherence. This is since they face strict rules, such as the prohibition of riba or 
interest in all transactions, prohibition of gharar or speculation in activities, the payment of zhakat - which 
can be seen as a social welfare or wealth redistribution payment banks have a duty to payout, and lastly all 
business and investments must be in those activities deemed halal or in line with Islamic principles – 
excluding anything to do with gambling, alcohol, etc.  
 
Visser’s (2013) discussion accompanies Hassan’s and explains how these principles form the unique balance 
sheet or assets and liabilities of an Islamic bank – though each individual bank is evidently open to its own 
goals as well as the laws of its country, plus the increasing need to interact with other interest-based banks. 
This brings in a list of financial instruments that are supposed to be built on the idea of either profit-sharing or 
profit-and-loss sharing (PLS). This is since it is important to note, in the Quran riba is clearly frowned up, but 
profit itself is not. Likewise, Lewis (2010) clarifies mudaraba and musharaka are the two most preferred PLS 
forms used by banks to raise funds. Mudaraba is a silent contract where one party is the financier who 
entrusts funds to the other party, who undertakes management of it and the venture. The entrepreneur 
becomes a trustee who returns the principal plus a pre-agreed profit while keeping the leftovers for himself. 
Thus, the financier is the one who bears the liability for losses, though it is limited to their own contribution. 
Musharaka is an equity partnership or joint venture contract where instead all parties have the right to 
management. Profits are pre-agreed and losses are shared too, based on contributions – and this type of 
contract is known for financing commercial enterprises, real estate development, or rural finance.  
 
Non-PLS instruments include the popular murabaha or cost-plus contract, ijara which is rent or lease that 
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still contains an allowable profit component, and types of loans with commission in place of interest. Sukuk is 
also a type of bond that cannot represent a debt as conventional bonds may, so it is instead obtained through 
the securitization of an asset. Aside from these there are many other even more complex instruments Islamic 
institutions may employ. With this, before his study, Fayed (2013) also explains Islamic banks maintain three 
types of deposit accounts: current, savings, and investment - with the latter two showing differences from 
conventional banks. Savings deposits vary and may involve a full guarantee, with no profit promised, while 
others are more like investments that banks use to invest in fairly risk-free and short-term projects. 
Investment deposits meanwhile are for a fixed or unlimited time period where profits or losses are expected to 
be shared in a given proportion with the bank. Capital isn’t guaranteed, though banks equip several methods 
to acquire assets or financing projects that can be broadly categorized into three areas: investment, trade and 
lending.  
 
Fayed’s performance study continues on to compare Islamic and conventional banking in Egypt between 
2008 to 2010, employing financial ratio analysis to gauge profitability, liquidity, credit risk, and solvency 
using the Bank-o-meter model. His project provides useful context for my own research, as his results 
indicate the superiority of conventional banks over Islamic ones in all ratio criteria – though he includes no 
further statistical analysis into these figures. With similar objective but more statistical testing, El Massah and 
Al-Sayed (2015) focus on the UAE and found differences in performance indicators are statistically 
significant. Islamic banks were on average less solvent, less profitable, more liquid, and yet had higher credit 
risk – matching Fayed’s findings. Another comparable study by Elsiefy (2013) looked at Qatar, while 
including growth rates, market shares, and such trends in its analysis of the ratios too in its attempt to also 
address whether Islamic banks are able to showcase sustainable growth amidst financial crisis. Looking at 
data pre and post the financial crisis, he found Islamic banks maintain stronger total assets, credit, and 
deposits growth rates but less sustainable profitability rates over conventional banks in these periods. His 
asset quality and risk ratios exhibit Islamic banks sustain lower nonperforming loans and are less leveraged 
too. He also interestingly found they were more efficient in utilizing assets and less liquid, which is 
inconsistent with the accepted view Islamic banks are excessively liquid. 
 
Aside from comparative performance studies, the other type of study consulted for this project includes those 
that employ their own linear regression models and extensively focus on establishing a relationship between a 
number of variables to profitability as the dependent. These involve complex statistical analysis but using 
Hassan and Bashir’s (2005) study on the determinants of profitability I attempted to understand these studies. 
Using their regression model and bank level data, they established a relationship between bank characteristics 
and a financial environment on the performance of Islamic banks. They came up with determinants of Islamic 
bank profitability while controlling for the macroenvironment, financial market structure, and taxation - 
including high capital and loan-to-asset ratios. They also asserted taxes negatively affect bank performance 
while fortunate macro conditions give positive performance. They also discovered profitability and overhead 
have a strong positive correlation. Alongside this, Buse, Ganea, and Circiumaru (2010) present a paper on 
how the analysis of financial-economic performances can be done through linear regression. They go through 
various techniques, explain an exhaustive number of variables that can be applied, and attempt to breakdown 
models and steps in testing them. Their objective was developing and applying an econometrical model 
capable of relating the economic rate of return, as an indicator of a firm’s financial-economic performance, 
with determinant factors in Romania. It was in the end a pretty high-level analysis I could partially 
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understand – but thus allowed me to narrow down my ideas for my own methodology in my study.  
 
After reading this, Yahya, Akhtar, and Tabash (2017) applied this to their own project on the effect of 
political instability and other macroeconomic factors on the profitability of Islamic banks in Yemen 
surrounding the Arab uprising. They likewise developed two of their own models for profitability with nine 
independent variables and ROA and ROE as dependents. Their statistical and regression results hold 
operating efficiency and financial risk have significant negative relationships with profitability, while capital 
adequacy exhibits an insignificant negative relationship. Onwards, assets size, assets management, liquidity, 
deposits, GDP, inflation, and political instability have a significant positive impact on ROA and ROE. A 
similar empirical study on Qatari banks by Ibrahim (2016) employed descriptive statistics, a t-test on each 
variable, and correlation and regression analyses like most other studies aforesaid. He found ROA, liquidity, 
and capital adequacy values are higher for Islamic banks – while bank size is greater with conventional. And 
his regression held bank size and liquidity are significant in affecting profitability for both bank models. A 
comparable study with parallel results done by Almanaseer (2014) took the same idea and applied it to 
multiple countries and a period of financial crisis, looking to the GCC during the 2005 to 2012. However, he 
found the financial crisis did not have a significant impact on Islamic banks profitability. He further found 
increasing owners’ equity decreased the impact of the financial crisis on profitability - while the impact of the 
financial crisis itself on profitability increased with likewise increasing total assets, liquidity, and overhead 
expenses. I also enjoyed the detailedness of the discussion of his hypotheses and results, which I may adapt.  
 
My research next took me to nonparametric statistics, due to the nature of the small bank population of 9 in 
total available through FactSet. Nonparametrics are used in times when regular parametric statistics are not 
applicable or cannot be assumed, where Corder and Foreman (2014) summate parametric samples as those 
that may be randomly drawn from a normally distributed population, consist of independent observations 
except for paired values, consist of values on an interval or ratio measurement scale, have respective 
populations of approximately equal variances, approximately resemble a normal distribution, or are 
adequately large - as prior researchers Pett (1997) and Salkind (2004) held most researchers suggest n > 30 
while Warner (2008) pushed for consideration of n > 20 as a minimum and n > 10 by group as a minimum. 
This led me to consider the Mann-Whitney U test, as it is the nonparametric equivalent of the t-test for 
independent samples. This test involves combining and rank ordering the data to determine if the values are 
randomly mixed or if they cluster at opposite ends. A random rank ordered signifies the two samples are not 
different, while clusters of one sample’s values would indicate a difference.  
 
Based off this, a Mann-Whitney U-test statistic for each of the two samples can be computed as; 
Ui = n1 n2 + 
𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖+1)
2
 − ∑ Ri 
where Ui is the test statistic for the sample of interest, 𝑛𝑖 is the number of values from the sample of interest, 
𝑛1 is the number of values from the first sample, 𝑛2 is the number of values from the second sample, and ∑ Ri 
is the sum of the ranks from the sample of interest. The lesser of the two computed values for U1 and U2 is 
chosen as the obtained value, U. Using this, the statistics can then be tested for significance by using a table 
of critical values given the sample sizes and a chosen level of risk or significance, known as α or alpha. This 
determines if the null and alternative hypotheses may be rejected, where the null hypothesis typically states 
the two samples are identical or have no significant difference in ranks while the alternative states the 
opposite. If the obtained value or U is more than or equal to the critical value or CV the null hypothesis must 
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not be rejected, whereas if it is less than the critical value it is be rejected.  
 
 
Following this, further analysis can be conducted to identify the strength of the treatment, or the degree of 





where ES varies from 0 to 1, |𝑍| signifies the absolute value of the z-score, and n the total number of 
observations. A value of .1 is thus identified as small or a weak association, .3 as medium or moderate, and .5 
as large or a strong association according to Cohen (1988).  
 
The formulas for finding the mean, standard deviation, and the z-score are further specified within the 





where ?̅? is the mean, and 𝑛1 is the number of values from the first sample and 𝑛2 the number of values from 
the second sample.  
 










with 𝑈𝑖 representing the U statistic from the sample of interest. 
 
Focusing on these key sources, I was able to narrow down my own project’s scope and methodology to 
include and explore many of the aforementioned concepts and tests. Looking at what others have done has 
also pushed me to not focus just on profitability like the latter studies do, but rather on establishing an overall 
picture of Islamic and conventional bank performance – as was my original objective. Hence, a review of the 
literature already present on this topic was key to my own comprehension of Islamic finance and allows me to 




The research question is as follows; “Is there a difference in the performance of conventional and Islamic 
banks in times of crises?” which will be answered by looking at a sample of banks focused on the Arab 
Spring time period in Egypt. 
 
Definitions of key terms include… 
 
• Performance refers to the comparative results of each bank’s ratios which serve as performance 
indicators (for efficiency, capital adequacy, profitability, solvency, liquidity, and credit risk)  
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• Islamic banks are those that employ “a banking system that is based on the principles of Islamic 
or Sharia law and guided by Islamic economics. Two fundamental principles of Islamic banking are 
the sharing of profit and loss, and the prohibition of the collection and payment of interest by lenders 
and investors” (Lim, 2019) 
 
• whereas Conventional banks for the purpose of this project are those that offer more than just 
Islamic or shariah compliant products, and are instead based off the debtor-creditor relationship and 
make profits off charging interest  
 
• Crisis refers to the chosen Arab Spring event, as representative of a crucial time of instability that 
branches out with significant effects on a state’s economic, political and other given affairs 
 
• Arab Spring as “a series of antigovernment uprisings affecting Arab countries of North Africa and 
the Middle East beginning in 2010” until about 2012 for the purposes of this paper (Arab Spring) 
 
• Egypt means only looking at a data sample focused in this country alone 
 
The main objectives for this project are:  
 
1) To look at the differences in performance for each bank model across time  
2) To look at the differences in performance across institutional types (conventional versus Islamic)  
3) To examine the variation of the impact of the crisis on each internal determinant (variable) of performance 
- using ratio and other non-parametric statistical analysis  
 
Since time is of importance to evaluating the effect of the progression through and after the crises on bank 
performance, and to see the difference of the crises period to before and after, 5 years of financial data are 
split into 3 approximated categories according to historical events while pin-pointing the onset of the crises 
towards the end of 2009; Before Arab Spring (2009), During Arab Spring (2010-2012), and After Arab 
Spring (2013). 
 
This will allow me to frame a picture of the effect of the Arab Spring on these differing banks and bank 
models over time, and pinpoint when and where each may have performed better or worse regarding the 
different performance indicators against time. In the end, the goal is for the analysis of the trends and 
significance in the disparities between ratios and banks to lead into my conclusions on this data sample and 
the overall topic of this research. 
 
Research Methodology 
Foremost, this project involves Financial Ratio Analysis of the performance indicators using historical 
financial statement data, including income statements and balance sheets. Financial ratios are beneficial in 
permitting mathematical comparisons of financial statement line items as both small and larger businesses are 
represented proportionally. The relationships between these statements and ratios allows one to compare 
different companies in given industries, as well as prove useful to illustrating the financial standing and 
performance of a business. There are many advantages to ratio analysis, including how they simplify financial 
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statements, facilitate inter-firm comparisons, and can have a part in investment or planning decisions. The 
bank data for this analysis has been obtained from primary data available in the FactSet database. The results 
of the ratio analysis are to be summated graphically to better visualize relative trends between bank models. 
 
Tests as said under objective 3 are planned to be performed. Due to the sample size, this will require non-
parametric statistical analysis as normality in the sample cannot be assumed. The non-parametric tests used in 
this study are a rank order test, specifically the Mann-Whitney U test since the two samples (Islamic and 
conventional banks) are independent, and Effect Size Analysis as explained in the literature review. Lastly a 
Descriptive Statistics Summary of mean, standard deviation, and skewness to compare and analyze the 
performance of Islamic and conventional banks is included. This provides simple summaries about the 
sample and the measures in a manageable form.  
 
This approach and methodology are appropriate for the frame and discipline of this project based off the 
extensive review of literature, where many other studies use a compilation of these methods and tests. This 
methodology and scope will also again allow me to differentiate my work from past work in this field to 
answer my unique question and small sample with the addition of nonparametric tests. With this, it is also 
important that I realize my own grasp of statistics and finance up to this point, and so cannot perform as 
complex tests as other professionals or published fellows in this field may – but am still open to being able to 
learn and perform a number of statistical analysis as aforementioned in my attempt to complete this project. 
 
Data Sample 
The data sample available in FactSet of 3 Islamic and 6 Conventional Banks covering the necessary years in 
Egypt are identified below, purposely excluding those banks specialized in certain areas of finance while 
understanding all the banks included have varying asset sizes. 
 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt Bank of Alexandria 
Al Baraka Bank Egypt Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait-Egypt 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank-Egypt Commercial International Bank-Egypt 
 Qatar National Bank Al-Ahli 
 Suez Canal Bank-Egypt 
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Measures a bank’s costs relative 
to income and spending relative to 
revenue generation. Lower ratios 
signify higher efficiency and cost 














Measures the effectiveness of 
management in keeping costs low 
while generating revenues. Lower 















𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
Measures a bank’s available 
capital relative to their risk-
weighted assets or credit 
exposures, and their ability to 
absorb losses in times of financial 
shock or downturn. Higher ratios 
signify greater capital adequacy 


























Measures the effectiveness of 
management in generating profits 
off its available assets. Higher 













Measures the effectiveness of 
management in using equity or 
net assets to earn profits. Higher 













Measures net income or profit to 
generated revenues, and how 
much each dollar of revenue 
translates into profit. Higher ratios 
signify higher profitability. 
 
The Arab Spring’s Effect on Islamic and Conventional Banks in Egypt                                                                                                                                          












𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝐴𝑣𝑔.  𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
Measures the difference between 
interest income generated by the 
banks and the amount paid out to 
depositors in relation to their 






























Measures a firm’s financial 
leverage and the degree of their 
financing through debt rather than 
self-owned funds. Also reflects 
the ability of shareholder equity to 
cover outstanding debts in times 
of financial shock or downturn. 
Too high ratios suggest a firm 
cannot generate enough cash to 
satisfy debt obligation, but too 
low suggest a firm is not taking 
advantage of increased profits. 





















Measures how much total assets is 
tied up in loans for a bank. Higher 
ratios signify lower liquidity and 















Measures a bank’s ability to cover 
loan losses and withdrawals from 
customers. Too high ratios 
suggest a firm is not liquid 
enough to cover unforeseen needs 
for funds, but too low suggest a 
firm is not earning optimally. 
Higher ratios signify lower 

















Measures a bank’s ability for 
equity to cover loan losses, as in 
times of financial shock or 
downturn. Higher ratios signify 
lower credit risk.  
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My hypotheses delve into my predictions (and some explanations for these) for each core variable or 
performance indicator category underneath the measurement of performance, as well as relative to the 
progression of time with the external crisis event, and for the nonparametric test to see whether we can accept 
the results of the ratio analysis as follows; 
 
Ratio Analysis Hypotheses  
 
H1: There are no significant differences in efficiency performance (Cost-Income Ratio & Operating 
Efficiency) between both bank models. 
H2: There is a negative relationship between efficiency and the external crisis for both bank models. 
H3: Conventional banks lead in capital adequacy (CAR). 
H4: There is a negative relationship between capital adequacy and the external crisis; this negative 
relationship is stronger or more apparent in conventional banks. 
▪ Presuming the effect of capital flight, etc. hits conventional banks harder 
H5: Conventional banks lead in all profitability indicators (ROA, ROE, NPM, NIM). 
H6: There is a negative relationship between profitability and the external crisis; this negative 
relationship is stronger or more apparent in conventional banks. 
▪ Presuming conventional banks are more concerned with achieving profits than Islamic 
banks. 
▪ Considering the positive relationship between profitability and risk. 
H7: Islamic banks lead in solvency (Debt-to-Equity). 
H8: There is a negative relationship between solvency and the external crisis; this negative 
relationship is stronger or more apparent in conventional banks. 
▪ Under presumption conventional banks have higher debt in general. 
H9 Islamic banks lead in all liquidity indicators (Loan-to-Assets & Loan-to-Deposits). 
H10: There is a positive relationship between liquidity and the external crisis; this positive relationship 
is stronger or more apparent in Islamic banks. 
▪ Under presumption Islamic banks are already more liquid before the crisis and only 
increase this throughout the crisis. 
H11: Conventional banks lead in credit risk (Total Equity to Net Loans). 
H12: There is a positive relationship between credit risk and the external crisis; this positive 
relationship is stronger or more apparent in conventional banks.  
▪ Under presumption conventional banks utilize more debt-financing while Islamic 
banking relies more on asset-backed securities and equity participation. 
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Mann-Whitney U Test Hypotheses 
 
HO: The two populations are identical, or there is no tendency of ranks of one method to be higher or 
lower than the other. 
HA: The two populations are not identical, or there is a tendency of ranks of one method to be 
systematically higher or lower than the other. 
 
Results 
Financial Ratio Graphs 
Figures 1-11 below illustrate trends between Conventional and Islamic Bank ratio results, with visible 
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Figure 4 – Return on Assets Ratio   Figure 5 – Return on Equity Ratio 
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Figure 11 – Total Equity to Net Loans Ratio 
 
Mann-Whitney U-Test Results 
As presented in Appendixes B through L, the rank tests for ‘All Years’ resulted in the U-statistic being 
greater than the critical value of 143, as identified in Appendix A due to rank samples or n of 15 and 30 and a 
chosen α of .05, except in the case of the last ratio of Total Equity to Net Loans (TENL) where the U-statistic 
was less than the critical value. This means all ratios aside from TENL result in acceptance of the null 
hypothesis (HO) and rejection of the alternative hypothesis (HA) – declaring both samples ratios tend to not be 
systematically higher or lower than one another with 95% confidence (α =.05). This in effect discredits the 
ability to normalize the differences in performance shown in Figures 1-10 for these two bank population 
samples in Egypt. The rank tests for ‘Year by Year’ were included to show the spread of the U-values across 
all 5 years, held against a smaller critical value of 1 due to n of 3 and 6 as shown in Appendix A. This reveals 
variance across the 5 years, with a U-value arising in both the Loan to Assets and Loan to Deposits ratios 
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Effect Size Results 
Results of the effect size analysis, as presented in Appendixes M through W, follow those of the Mann 
Whitney U-test as looking at ‘All Years’ indicates all ratios other than for TENL resulted in a weak degree of 
association or strength, or small effect size between both sample groups, whereas TENL resulted in a 
moderate strength or medium effect size. This in consequence states that there is a weak significance of the 
results or differences observed between both groups ratio performance. The results for ‘Year by Year’ were 
again included to point out observed variance in the effect size from weak to moderate and even sometimes 
strong across the 5-year periods, as in Appendixes M through O and S through W. Moreover, these identified 
strong points when matched up to the financial ratio graphs are frequently at points of the graph when both 
sample groups move in opposite or parallel directions to each other rather than in convergence. Herein these 
results may also be affected by the short time span and sample looked at in this study. 
 
Descriptive Statistics Summary
Figure 12 below offers a statistical summary for each sample’s ratios, allowing for side to side comparison of 







Deviation Minimum Maximum 
    Islamic Conv Islamic Conv Islamic Conv Islamic Conv 
# Observations  15 30 15 30 15 30 15 30 
Efficiency 
Cost-Income 0.4535 0.4239 2.2697 3.8643 -4.5699 -9.6947 4.7088 12.7519 




0.0785 0.0905 0.0272 0.0289 0.0291 0.0307 0.1237 0.1260 
Profitability 
ROA 0.0010 0.0044 0.0225 0.0197 -0.0458 -0.0605 0.0266 0.0264 
ROE -0.0868 -0.0224 0.4751 0.4365 -1.3974 -1.9201 0.2340 0.2514 
NPM -0.2360 0.0281 1.2234 0.5789 -4.2190 0.5013 0.4956 0.5013 
NIM 0.1086 0.1158 0.0594 0.0554 0.0253 0.0396 0.2274 0.3025 
Solvency 
Debt-to-
Equity 0.4683 0.4472 0.4469 0.4121 0.0201 0.0497 1.4164 1.4308 
Liquidity 
Loans-to-
Assets 0.4570 0.4562 0.1403 0.1352 0.1635 0.1212 0.6384 0.6607 
Loans-to-
Deposits 0.5384 0.5511 0.1725 0.1687 0.1797 0.1378 0.7267 0.7837 
Credit Risk TENL 
0.1478 0.2088 0.0606 0.0923 0.0662 0.0734 0.2676 0.5252 
Figure 12 – Descriptive Statistics Summary
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Withstanding the nonparametric tests disability to generalize or make significant these two samples 
results, a discussion of the visible trends across these bank samples and time period within the realm of 
this specific population sample study is relevant towards our understanding of Islamic and Conventional 
banks operations and performance amidst crises. As shown in Figures 4-6 and 8-10, key points of 
intersection exist at least 1 to 2 times over the course of the short 5 year period examined for most ratios – 
especially in 2010 and 2012, which are critical periods around the onset and easing of the crises event that 
appear to denote moments of recovery or re-balancing in the trends. On the other hand, Figure 11 for 
TENL suggests the two samples start to converge following 2013 - presumably in a shared effort by both 
banks to re-stabilize credit risks post-crises.  
 
Further discussion of the financial ratio results relative to the proposed hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H1: There are no significant differences in efficiency performance (Cost-Income Ratio & Operating 
Efficiency) between both bank models. 
 
H1 is rejected regarding the Cost to Income ratio based off Figure 1, where both sample groups continuously 
move inversely to one another, whereas based off Figure 2 H1 is accepted for the Operating Efficiency ratio. 
Figure 1’s rather high volatility suggests both bank models struggled with managing costs and profits, notably 
in their ability to generate revenues which for many fiscal years during the Arab Spring were reported 
negative. There is less variability between Islamic and conventional banks performance in Figure 2, where 
they converge throughout 2010-2011 while conventional banks were able to increase operating efficiency 
2011 and after showing further careful management of costs. 
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between efficiency and the external crisis for both bank models. 
 
H2 is accepted regarding the Cost to Income ratio as shown in Figure 1, where for both bank models this 
efficiency performance declined and became rather volatile over the course of the Arab Spring. H2 is 
meanwhile rejected for Operating Efficiency as shown in Figure 2, Islamic banks efficiency performance was 
little effected over the course of the Arab Spring whereas conventional banks saw a decrease and thus higher 
operational efficiency 2011-2013. 
 
H3: Conventional banks lead in capital adequacy (CAR). 
 
H3 is accepted based off Figure 3 as well as Figure 12 since overall conventional banks tended to lead in 
terms of CAR, with their mean and minimum values being consistently higher than those of the Islamic bank 
group. This reveals conventional banks generally have higher levels of capital available to them as in terms of 
common equity, which allows them to better absorb shock and lessen risk, while Islamic banks were able to 
increase CAR during the course of the crisis. 
 
H4: There is a negative relationship between capital adequacy and the external crisis; this negative 
relationship is stronger or more apparent in conventional banks. 
 
H4 is rejected as unlike expected in Figure 3, the crises event had a positive effect on CAR for Islamic banks 
while performance did drop minimally for conventional banks. This may be contributed by earlier 
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presumptions on the effect of capital flight hitting conventional banks harder and ability to retain capital 
relative to assets, showing conventional banks are strained more in meeting financial obligations during the 
Arab Spring in terms of this stability measure. 
 
H5: Conventional banks lead in all profitability indicators (ROA, ROE, NPM, NIM). 
 
H5 is accepted for all profitability ratios other than NIM, as shown in Figure 7 conventional banks were 
negatively affected midway through the crises period. This is contributed by a decreasing amount of income 
or revenue generated off increasing assets and equity for the overall Islamic bank group. This shows that even 
with profit-loss-sharing instruments implemented, Islamic banks faced substantial losses during the crises 
period - which falls in line with lower profitability’s reported in past studies (Fayed, 2013; Elsiefy 2013). 
Conversely, the Islamic banks increase in NIM performance during the course of the crises rejects H5 as 
Islamic banks as a group were able to generate increasing interest income with amounts of earning assets in 
face of the crisis while conventional banks were unable to.  
 
H6: There is a negative relationship between profitability and the external crisis; this negative relationship 
is stronger or more apparent in conventional banks. 
 
H6 is rejected as all profitability ratios other than NIM show a stronger negative relationship between the 
crises and profitability in the Islamic group. Figures 4-6 show Islamic banks were significantly negatively 
impacted by the Arab Spring, with drops in ROA, ROE, and NPM performance in 2010 to 2011 while 
conventional banks were able to stabilize profitability performance during the crises period. 
 
H7: Islamic banks lead in solvency (Debt-to-Equity). 
 
H7 is rejected as Figure 8 shows conventional banks had less volatile and lower Debt-to-Equity performance 
over the total sample study’s period, whereas Islamic banks faced larger debt obligations with higher risk that 
significantly increased solvency performance nearing the crisis period – and then dropped following it. 
 
H8: There is a negative relationship between solvency and the external crisis; this negative relationship is 
stronger or more apparent in conventional banks. 
 
H8 is rejected as again conventional banks were able to lead in solvency performance withstanding the crisis 
period, while the negative relationship between the crisis and solvency is more apparent in the Islamic bank 
group’s higher Debt-to-Equity performance. 
 
H9 Islamic banks lead in all liquidity indicators (Loan-to-Assets & Loan-to-Deposits). 
 
H9 is rejected as Figures 9-10 show the conventional bank group was able to maintain less volatile and lower 
liquidity ratio performance throughout the sample’s study period relative to Islamic banks, suggesting more 
of Islamic banks total assets are tied up in loans as well as more loans being unable to be covered by deposits. 
 
H10: There is a positive relationship between liquidity and the external crisis; this positive relationship is 
stronger or more apparent in Islamic banks. 
 
H10 is rejected as the Islamic bank group faced a sharp increase and decrease in performance around the 
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identified onset and end of the crisis period, showing a negative relationship between time and liquidity 
performance – while the conventional group’s liquidity performance was little effected by the external crisis. 
 
H11: Conventional banks lead in credit risk (Total Equity to Net Loans). 
 
H11 is accepted as conventional banks showed higher credit risk performance overall in the study’s years 
relative to Islamic banks in Figure 11 and thus lower credit risk - though with a slight drop in 2011 and thus 
weakening ability to cover loan losses in the middle of the crisis event and following.  
 
H12: There is a positive relationship between credit risk and the external crisis; this positive relationship is 
stronger or more apparent in conventional banks.  
 
H12 is accepted for Islamic banks while rejected for conventional banks who showed a negative relationship 
or drop in credit risk performance during the crisis period, while suggesting nearing convergence of both 
groups following post-crisis 2012 and after.  
 
Conclusions and Further Research 
This study investigated the impact of the external Arab Spring crisis event on Islamic and conventional bank 
group’s performance in Egypt from 2009 to 2013, through financial ratio analysis of performance indicators 
reflective of efficiency, capital adequacy, profitability, solvency, liquidity, and credit risk - and whether these 
then suggest a difference in performance related to differences amid bank models. The results of this analysis 
broke many preconceived assumptions on the capital breakdown and strategies of both models and the crisis’s 
effect, as revealed in the Discussion. These observed differences in performance were tested for significance 
through nonparametric tests, in which all ratios except TENL were found to not be statistically significant 
with 95% confidence and to have a small effect size. And yet with a small and statistically insignificant 
sample, the ratio conclusions replicate those of Fayed (2013), El-Massah and Al-Sayed (2015) among others.  
 
Results of the ratio analysis in the realm of this sample study, referring back to the original question, indicate 
that regarding efficiency and capital adequacy performance there is no difference between models – while 
profitability, solvency, liquidity, and credit risk result in an observed difference as further discussed below: 
 
1) Considering efficiency performance, Cost-Income performance is far more volatile and effected by a 
crisis event than Operational Efficiency – suggesting common challenges as well as responses to 
maintaining efficiency may exist between both bank models. 
2) Capital adequacy is a smaller concern for both bank models as both had strategies in place that 
allowed them to fairly maintain or increase absorption of shock throughout the crisis event. 
3) Profitability is significantly impacted by crisis events for both bank models, but especially an area of 
concern for Islamic banks – who should consider policies or financial instruments that may decrease 
volatility or curb losses. 
4) Solvency is significantly impacted by crisis events for both bank models, but especially an area of 
concern for Islamic banks pre-crisis – and should rebalance leverage or limit the use of debt financing 
in times of shock. 
5) Liquidity is a larger concern for Islamic banks during a crisis event whereas conventional banks have 
strategies or less reliance on loans during the course of the crisis that allow them to better withstand 
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liquidity needs during a crisis.  
6) Credit risk is a larger concern for conventional banks in the face of a crisis event while Islamic banks 
are able to decrease this risk – and so conventional banks should consider possible credit or loan 
limits or other such precautions in times of crisis. Since this performance starts to converge post-
crisis, it also suggests growing convergence in practices between models in managing credit risk. 
 
Continuing this study on a larger scale or diverse sample outside of Egypt relative to an event may be 
considered to see the effect on bank model performance as well as on earning statistically significant results. 
This study was limited to bank data available on FactSet, while identifiable resources available with more 
funding include BankScope and The Banker which can increase the sample. A deeper look at whether the 
Islamic banks looked at in this study are purely PLS or not and what type of financial instruments they offer 
may also be considered in future studies, and how this may explain their performance. This may also lead into 
discussion of banking regulations or policies across firms and best practices in times of crises.  
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Appendix A - Critical Values for the Mann-Whitney U-Test 
 
Level of significance: 95% (P = 0.05) 
Size of the largest sample (n2) 
        6       7 8 9 10    11    12     13    14    15     16    17    18     19     20    21     22    23     24    25    26    27    28  29  30  












































































  1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 13 13 
  2 3 4 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
  3 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 22 23 24 25 27 28 29 30 32 33 
  5 6 8 10 11 13 14 16 17 19 21 22 24 25 27 29 30 32 33 35 37 38 40 42 43 
  
 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 
    
13 15 17 19 22 24 26 29 31 34 36 38 41 43 45 48 50 53 55 57 60 62 65 
     
17 20 23 26 28 31 34 37 39 42 45 48 50 53 56 59 62 64 67 70 73 76 
      
23 26 29 33 36 39 42 45 48 52 55 58 61 64 67 71 74 77 80 83 87 
       
30 33 37 40 44 47 51 55 58 62 65 69 73 76 80 83 87 90 94 98 
        
37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 101 105 109 
         
45 50 54 59 63 67 72 76 80 85 89 94 98 102 107 111 116 120 
          
55 59 64 67 74 78 83 88 93 98 102 107 112 118 122 127 131 
           
64 70 75 80 85 90 96 101 106 111 117 122 125 132 138 143 
            
75 81 86 92 98 103 109 115 120 126 132 138 143 149 154 
             
87 93 99 105 111 117 123 129 135 141 147 154 160 166 
              
99 106 112 119 125 132 138 145 151 158 164 171 177 
               
113 119 126 133 140 147 154 161 168 175 182 189 
                
127 134 141 149 156 163 171 178 186 193 200 
                 
142 150 157 165 173 181 188 196 204 212 
                  
158 166 174 182 191 199 207 215 223 
                   
175 183 192 200 209 218 226 235 
                    
192 201 210 219 228 238 247 
                     
211 220 230 239 249 258 
                      
230 240 250 260 270 
                       
250 261 271 282 
                        
272 282 293 
                         
294 305 
                          
317 
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Appendix B - Cost-Income Ratio - Mann-Whitney U-Test Results 
All Years: 
 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  
U-
Value    
2009 
4.7088 2 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 358  212 
0.8676 22 Islamic       
1.1317 15 Islamic          
0.8244 24 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 661  254    
-0.9712 37 Conv          
12.7519 1 Conv  Critical Value (.05α) = 143       
1.4807 10 Conv          
1.7074 9 Conv          
-9.4653 44 Conv  Interpret Results       
2010 
4.0602 4 Islamic          
0.9727 18 Islamic          
-0.7678 36 Islamic  U > CV Accept HO       
-1.2278 38 Conv   RejectHA      
1.7954 8 Conv         
1.9897 7 Conv       
-5.1484 43 Conv          
0.9669 19 Conv          
0.5234 31 Conv          
2011 
-0.5244 35 Islamic          
-1.6812 39 Islamic          
0.9501 20 Islamic          
2.7489 5 Conv          
-2.3814 41 Conv          
0.9314 21 Conv          
0.6047 30 Conv          
1.0036 17 Conv          
0.8111 25 Conv          
2012 
1.3394 12 Islamic          
1.2611 13 Islamic          
-2.0095 40 Islamic          
0.4621 32 Conv          
0.8658 23 Conv          
0.8024 26 Conv          
0.6165 29 Conv          
-9.6947 45 Conv          
2.4560 6 Conv          
2013 
-4.5699 42 Islamic          
0.3053 33 Islamic          
0.7577 27 Islamic          
1.0097 16 Conv          
0.6453 28 Conv          
-0.4990 34 Conv          
4.4381 3 Conv          
1.4550 11 Conv          
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Year by Year 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  
U-
Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
4.7088 2 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 13  11    
0.8676 6 Islamic            
1.1317 5 Islamic         





-0.9712 8 Conv         
12.7519 1 Conv    Critical Value (.05α) = 1 
1.4807 4 Conv            
1.7074 3 Conv            
-9.4653 9 Conv            
2010 
4.0602 1 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 12  12      
0.9727 4 Islamic            
-0.7678 7 Islamic            
-1.2278 8 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 33  6  U >CV 
Accept 
HO 
1.7954 3 Conv            
1.9897 2 Conv            
-5.1484 9 Conv            
0.9669 5 Conv            
0.5234 6 Conv            
2011 
-0.5244 7 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 18  6  U >CV 
Accept 
HO 
-1.6812 8 Islamic            
0.9501 3 Islamic            
2.7489 1 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 27  12      
-2.3814 9 Conv            
0.9314 4 Conv            
0.6047 6 Conv            
1.0036 2 Conv            
0.8111 5 Conv            
2012 
1.3394 2 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 13  11      
1.2611 3 Islamic            
-2.0095 8 Islamic            





0.8658 4 Conv            
0.8024 5 Conv            
0.6165 6 Conv            
-9.6947 9 Conv            
2.4560 1 Conv            
2013 





0.3053 7 Islamic            
0.7577 5 Islamic            
1.0097 4 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 24  15      
0.6453 6 Conv            
-0.4990 8 Conv         
4.4381 1 Conv            
1.4550 2 Conv            
1.2134 3 Conv            
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Appendix C - Operating Efficiency Ratio - Mann-Whitney U-Test Results 
All Years: 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  
U-
Value  Interpret Results  
2009 
0.0252 18 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 336  234     
0.0248 19 Islamic           
0.0118 43 Islamic           
0.0214 27 Conv  ∑RC Conv: 699  216  U>CV Accept HO 
0.0440 5 Conv          
0.0207 30 Conv            
0.0301 13 Conv            
0.0210 29 Conv            
0.0398 8 Conv            
2010 
0.0235 23 Islamic            
0.0242 20 Islamic            
0.0438 6 Islamic            
0.0275 15 Conv            
0.0271 16 Conv            
0.0231 25 Conv            
0.0517 2 Conv            
0.0319 12 Conv            
0.0193 34 Conv            
2011 
0.0510 3 Islamic            
0.0162 40 Islamic            
0.0211 28 Islamic            
0.0241 21 Conv            
0.0604 1 Conv            
0.0292 14 Conv            
0.0198 33 Conv            
0.0169 39 Conv            
0.0238 22 Conv            
2012 
0.0255 17 Islamic            
0.0204 31 Islamic            
0.0404 7 Islamic            
0.0095 44 Conv            
0.0203 32 Conv            
0.0136 41 Conv            
0.0178 38 Conv            
0.0467 4 Conv            
0.0186 36 Conv            
2013 
0.0390 10 Islamic            
0.0070 45 Islamic            
0.0231 26 Islamic            
0.0133 42 Conv            
0.0184 37 Conv            
0.0393 9 Conv            
0.0187 35 Conv            
0.0324 11 Conv            
0.0232 24 Conv            
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Year by Year 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  
U-
Value  Interpret Results 
2009 





0.0248 5 Islamic          
0.0118 9 Islamic          
0.0214 6 Conv  ∑RC Conv: 27  12    
0.0440 1 Conv          
0.0207 8 Conv          
0.0301 3 Conv          
0.0210 7 Conv          
0.0398 2 Conv          
2010 
0.0235 7 Islamic  ∑RI Islamic: 15  9    
0.0242 6 Islamic          
0.0438 2 Islamic          





0.0271 5 Conv          
0.0231 8 Conv          
0.0517 1 Conv          
0.0319 3 Conv          
0.0193 9 Conv          
2011 





0.0162 9 Islamic          
0.0211 6 Islamic          
0.0241 4 Conv  ∑RC Conv: 28  11    
0.0604 1 Conv          
0.0292 3 Conv          
0.0198 7 Conv          
0.0169 8 Conv          
0.0238 5 Conv          
2012 
0.0255 3 Islamic  ∑RI Islamic: 9  15    
0.0204 4 Islamic          
0.0404 2 Islamic          





0.0203 5 Conv          
0.0136 8 Conv          
0.0178 7 Conv          
0.0467 1 Conv          
0.0186 6 Conv          
2013 
0.0390 2 Islamic  ∑RI Islamic: 16  8  U>CV AcceptHO 
0.0070 9 Islamic          
0.0231 5 Islamic          
0.0133 8 Conv  ∑RC Conv: 29  10    
0.0184 7 Conv          
0.0393 1 Conv      
0.0187 6 Conv          
0.0324 3 Conv          
0.0232 4 Conv          
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Appendix D - CAR - Mann-Whitney U-Test Results 
All Years 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.0569 39 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 409  161  U > CV Accept HO 
0.0982 20 Islamic         Reject HA 
0.0602 37 Islamic          
0.1072 16 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 626  289    
0.0400 42 Conv          
0.1138 10 Conv          
0.1039 19 Conv          
0.1073 14 Conv          
0.0708 29 Conv          
2010 
0.0506 40 Islamic          
0.0975 23 Islamic          
0.0291 45 Islamic          
0.1214 5 Conv          
0.0970 24 Conv          
0.1185 6 Conv          
0.0779 26 Conv          
0.0732 28 Conv          
0.1051 18 Conv          
2011 
0.0469 41 Islamic          
0.1237 3 Islamic          
0.0978 21 Islamic          
0.1260 1 Conv          
0.0610 35 Conv          
0.0648 32 Conv          
0.1148 8 Conv          
0.0638 33 Conv          
0.1218 4 Conv          
2012 
0.0894 25 Islamic          
0.1092 12 Islamic          
0.0664 31 Islamic          
0.0594 38 Conv          
0.0976 22 Conv          
0.0612 34 Conv          
0.1245 2 Conv          
0.0371 43 Conv          
0.1057 17 Conv          
2013 
0.0756 27 Islamic          
0.0683 30 Islamic          
0.1073 15 Islamic          
0.0608 36 Conv          
0.1166 7 Conv          
0.0307 44 Conv          
0.1084 13 Conv          
0.1104 11 Conv          
0.1145 9 Conv          
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Year by Year 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.0569 8 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 20  4  U>CV Accept HO 
0.0982 5 Islamic          
0.0602 7 Islamic          
0.1072 3 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 25  14    
0.0400 9 Conv          
0.1138 1 Conv          
0.1039 4 Conv          
0.1073 2 Conv          
0.0708 6 Conv          
2010 
0.0506 8 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 21  3  U>CV Accept HO 
0.0975 4 Islamic          
0.0291 9 Islamic          
0.1214 1 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 24  15    
0.0970 5 Conv          
0.1185 2 Conv          
0.0779 6 Conv          
0.0732 7 Conv          
0.1051 3 Conv          
2011 
0.0469 9 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 16  8  U>CV Accept HO 
0.1237 2 Islamic          
0.0978 5 Islamic          
0.1260 1 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 29  10    
0.0610 8 Conv          
0.0648 6 Conv          
0.1148 4 Conv          
0.0638 7 Conv          
0.1218 3 Conv          
2012 
0.0894 5 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 13  11    
0.1092 2 Islamic          
0.0664 6 Islamic          
0.0594 8 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 32  7  U>CV Accept HO 
0.0976 4 Conv          
0.0612 7 Conv          
0.1245 1 Conv          
0.0371 9 Conv          
0.1057 3 Conv          
2013 
0.0756 6 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 18  6  U>CV Accept HO 
0.0683 7 Islamic          
0.1073 5 Islamic          
0.0608 8 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 27  12    
0.1166 1 Conv          
0.0307 9 Conv      
0.1084 4 Conv         
0.1104 3 Conv          
0.1145 2 Conv          
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Appendix E - ROA Ratio - Mann-Whitney U-Test Results 
All Years 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  
U-
Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.0045 30 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 355  215  U>CV Accept HO 
0.0236 5 Islamic         Reject HA 
0.0078 23 Islamic          
0.0220 7 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 674  241    
-0.0433 43 Conv          
0.0000 32 Conv          
0.0152 15 Conv          
0.0062 25 Conv          
-0.0111 36 Conv          
2010 
0.0048 29 Islamic          
0.0208 9 Islamic          
-0.0413 42 Islamic          
0.0000 32 Conv          
0.0088 21 Conv          
0.0070 24 Conv          
-0.0192 40 Conv          
0.0154 14 Conv          
0.0264 2 Conv          
2011 
-0.0458 44 Islamic          
-0.0130 37 Islamic          
0.0176 11 Islamic          
0.0061 26 Conv          
-0.0255 41 Conv          
0.0150 16 Conv          
0.0237 4 Conv          
0.0091 20 Conv          
0.0218 8 Conv          
2012 
0.0163 12 Islamic          
0.0126 17 Islamic          
-0.0162 39 Islamic          
0.0054 28 Conv          
0.0189 10 Conv          
0.0081 22 Conv          
0.0229 6 Conv          
0.0044 31 Conv          
0.0000 32 Conv          
2013 
-0.0145 38 Islamic          
0.0107 18 Islamic          
0.0266 1 Islamic          
0.0056 27 Conv          
0.0238 3 Conv          
-0.0605 45 Conv          
0.0000 32 Conv          
0.0162 13 Conv          
0.0094 19 Conv          
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Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.0045 6 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 11  13    
0.0236 1 Islamic          
0.0078 4 Islamic          
0.0220 2 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 34  5  U>CV Accept HO 
-0.0433 9 Conv          
0.0000 7 Conv          
0.0152 3 Conv          
0.0062 5 Conv          
-0.0111 8 Conv          
2010 
0.0048 6 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 17  7  U>CV Accept HO 
0.0208 2 Islamic          
-0.0413 9 Islamic          
0.0000 7 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 28  11    
0.0088 4 Conv          
0.0070 5 Conv          
-0.0192 8 Conv          
0.0154 3 Conv          
0.0264 1 Conv          
2011 
-0.0458 9 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 19  5  U>CV Accept HO 
-0.0130 7 Islamic          
0.0176 3 Islamic          
0.0061 6 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 26  13    
-0.0255 8 Conv          
0.0150 4 Conv          
0.0237 1 Conv          
0.0091 5 Conv          
0.0218 2 Conv          
2012 
0.0163 3 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 16  8  U>CV Accept HO 
0.0126 4 Islamic          
-0.0162 9 Islamic          
0.0054 6 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 29  10    
0.0189 2 Conv          
0.0081 5 Conv          
0.0229 1 Conv          
0.0044 7 Conv          
0.0000 8 Conv          
2013 
-0.0145 8 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 13  11    
0.0107 4 Islamic          
0.0266 1 Islamic          
0.0056 6 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 32  7  U>CV Reject HO 
0.0238 2 Conv          
-0.0605 9 Conv       
0.0000 7 Conv          
0.0162 3 Conv          
0.0094 5 Conv          
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Appendix F - ROE Ratio - Mann-Whitney U-Test Results 
All 
Years 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.0786 28 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 346  224  U>CV Accept HO 
0.2161 4 Islamic         Reject HA 
0.1303 20 Islamic          
0.2020 7 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 683  232    
-1.0648 43 Conv          
0.0000 32 Conv          
0.1457 16 Conv          
0.0576 30 Conv          
-0.1427 37 Conv          
2010 
0.0945 23 Islamic          
0.2005 9 Islamic          
-1.3974 44 Islamic          
0.0000 32 Conv          
0.0897 26 Conv          
0.0587 29 Conv          
-0.2233 40 Conv          
0.2086 5 Conv          
0.2514 1 Conv          
2011 
-0.9725 42 Islamic          
-0.1047 36 Islamic          
0.1785 13 Islamic          
0.0481 31 Conv          
-0.3645 41 Conv          
0.2291 3 Conv          
0.2057 6 Conv          
0.1422 18 Conv          
0.1774 14 Conv          
2012 
0.1826 11 Islamic          
0.1156 22 Islamic          
-0.2223 39 Islamic          
0.0902 25 Conv          
0.1848 10 Conv          
0.1322 19 Conv          
0.1823 12 Conv          
0.1165 21 Conv          
0.0000 32 Conv          
2013 
-0.1916 38 Islamic          
0.1563 15 Islamic          
0.2340 2 Islamic          
0.0915 24 Conv          
0.2019 8 Conv          
-1.9201 45 Conv          
0.0000 32 Conv          
0.1456 17 Conv          
0.0819 27 Conv          
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Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.0786 5 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 10  14    
0.2161 1 Islamic          
0.1303 4 Islamic          
0.2020 2 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 35  4  U>CV Accept HO 
-1.0648 9 Conv          
0.0000 7 Conv          
0.1457 3 Conv          
0.0576 6 Conv          
-0.1427 8 Conv          
2010 
0.0945 4 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 16  8  U>CV Accept HO 
0.2005 3 Islamic          
-1.3974 9 Islamic          
0.0000 7 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 29  10    
0.0897 5 Conv          
0.0587 6 Conv          
-0.2233 8 Conv          
0.2086 2 Conv          
0.2514 1 Conv          
2011 
-0.9725 9 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 19  5  U>CV Accept HO 
-0.1047 7 Islamic          
0.1785 3 Islamic          
0.0481 6 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 26  13    
-0.3645 8 Conv          
0.2291 1 Conv          
0.2057 2 Conv          
0.1422 5 Conv          
0.1774 4 Conv          
2012 
0.1826 2 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 17  7  U>CV Accept HO 
0.1156 6 Islamic          
-0.2223 9 Islamic          
0.0902 7 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 28  11    
0.1848 1 Conv          
0.1322 4 Conv          
0.1823 3 Conv          
0.1165 5 Conv          
0.0000 8 Conv          
2013 
-0.1916 8 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 12  12    
0.1563 3 Islamic          
0.2340 1 Islamic          
0.0915 5 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 33  6  U>CV Accept HO 
0.2019 2 Conv          
-1.9201 9 Conv      
0.0000 7 Conv         
0.1456 4 Conv          
0.0819 6 Conv          
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Appendix G - NPM Ratio - Mann-Whitney U-Test Results 
All 
Years 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results  
2009 
0.1465 30 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 338  232     
0.4310 6 Islamic           
0.3018 15 Islamic           
0.4749 4 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 691  224  U>CV Accept HO 
-1.6853 43 Conv         Reject HA 
0.0000 32 Conv           
0.2498 17 Conv           
0.1529 29 Conv           
-0.2585 36 Conv           
2010 
0.1633 27 Islamic           
0.4504 5 Islamic           
-1.4654 42 Islamic           
0.0000 32 Conv           
0.1692 25 Conv           
0.1831 23 Conv           
-0.3953 38 Conv           
0.2324 20 Conv           
0.4118 7 Conv           
2011 
-4.2190 45 Islamic           
-0.4033 39 Islamic           
0.3753 10 Islamic           
0.1565 28 Conv           
-0.5008 40 Conv           
0.2442 18 Conv           
0.4010 8 Conv           
0.2353 19 Conv           
0.3643 11 Conv           
2012 
0.3549 12 Islamic           
0.3450 14 Islamic           
-0.5437 41 Islamic           
0.1729 24 Conv           
0.3976 9 Conv           
0.2224 21 Conv           
0.5013 1 Conv           
0.1156 31 Conv           
0.0000 32 Conv           
2013 
-0.3202 37 Islamic           
0.3475 13 Islamic           
0.4956 2 Islamic           
0.1652 26 Conv           
0.4860 3 Conv           
-2.1261 44 Conv           
0.0000 32 Conv           
0.2619 16 Conv           
0.2096 22 Conv           
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Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.1465 6 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 11  13    
0.4310 2 Islamic          
0.3018 3 Islamic          
0.4749 1 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 34  5  U>CV Accept HO 
-1.6853 9 Conv          
0.0000 7 Conv          
0.2498 4 Conv          
0.1529 5 Conv          
-0.2585 8 Conv          
2010 
0.1633 6 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 16  8  U>CV Accept HO 
0.4504 1 Islamic          
-1.4654 9 Islamic          
0.0000 7 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 29  10    
0.1692 5 Conv          
0.1831 4 Conv          
-0.3953 8 Conv          
0.2324 3 Conv          
0.4118 2 Conv          
2011 
-4.2190 9 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 18  6  U>CV Accept HO 
-0.4033 7 Islamic          
0.3753 2 Islamic          
0.1565 6 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 27  12    
-0.5008 8 Conv          
0.2442 4 Conv          
0.4010 1 Conv          
0.2353 5 Conv          
0.3643 3 Conv          
2012 
0.3549 3 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 16  8  U>CV Accept HO 
0.3450 4 Islamic          
-0.5437 9 Islamic          
0.1729 6 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 29  10    
0.3976 2 Conv          
0.2224 5 Conv          
0.5013 1 Conv          
0.1156 7 Conv          
0.0000 8 Conv          
2013 
-0.3202 8 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 12  12    
0.3475 3 Islamic          
0.4956 1 Islamic          
0.1652 6 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 33  6  U>CV Accept HO 
0.4860 2 Conv          
-2.1261 9 Conv       
0.0000 7 Conv          
0.2619 4 Conv          
0.2096 5 Conv          
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Appendix H - NIM Ratio - Mann-Whitney U-Test Results 
All 
Years 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.1032 24 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 361  209  U>CV Accept HO 
0.1104 21 Islamic         Reject HA 
0.0577 40 Islamic          
0.1170 17 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 674  241    
0.0396 44 Conv          
0.0733 34 Conv          
0.1846 6 Conv          
0.0998 25 Conv          
0.1940 5 Conv          
2010 
0.0431 42 Islamic          
0.1578 9 Islamic          
0.0430 43 Islamic          
0.0681 36 Conv          
0.1580 8 Conv          
0.1121 20 Conv          
0.1988 4 Conv          
0.0989 26 Conv          
0.1145 19 Conv          
2011 
0.0253 45 Islamic          
0.0729 35 Islamic          
0.1569 11 Islamic          
0.1299 14 Conv          
0.3025 1 Conv          
0.0960 27 Conv          
0.1302 13 Conv          
0.0761 31 Conv          
0.1290 15 Conv          
2012 
0.1332 12 Islamic          
0.1154 18 Islamic          
0.2274 2 Islamic          
0.0584 39 Conv          
0.1101 22 Conv          
0.0745 32 Conv          
0.1575 10 Conv          
0.0834 30 Conv          
0.0569 41 Conv          
2013 
0.2048 3 Islamic          
0.0734 33 Islamic          
0.1045 23 Islamic          
0.0856 29 Conv          
0.1287 16 Conv          
0.0636 38 Conv          
0.0664 37 Conv          
0.1747 7 Conv          
0.0916 28 Conv          
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Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.1032 5 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 17  7  U>CV Accept HO 
0.1104 4 Islamic          
0.0577 8 Islamic          
0.1170 3 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 28  11    
0.0396 9 Conv          
0.0733 7 Conv          
0.1846 2 Conv          
0.0998 6 Conv          
0.1940 1 Conv          
2010 
0.0431 8 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 20  4  U>CV Accept HO 
0.1578 3 Islamic          
0.0430 9 Islamic          
0.0681 7 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 25  14    
0.1580 2 Conv          
0.1121 5 Conv          
0.1988 1 Conv          
0.0989 6 Conv          
0.1145 4 Conv          
2011 
0.0253 9 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 19  5  U>CV Accept HO 
0.0729 8 Islamic          
0.1569 2 Islamic          
0.1299 4 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 26  13    
0.3025 1 Conv          
0.0960 6 Conv          
0.1302 3 Conv          
0.0761 7 Conv          
0.1290 5 Conv          
2012 
0.1332 3 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 8  16    
0.1154 4 Islamic          
0.2274 1 Islamic          
0.0584 8 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 37  2  U>CV Accept HO 
0.1101 5 Conv          
0.0745 7 Conv          
0.1575 2 Conv          
0.0834 6 Conv          
0.0569 9 Conv          
2013 
0.2048 1 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 12  12    
0.0734 7 Islamic          
0.1045 4 Islamic          
0.0856 6 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 33  6  U>CV Accept HO 
0.1287 3 Conv          
0.0636 9 Conv       
0.0664 8 Conv          
0.1747 2 Conv          
0.0916 5 Conv          
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Appendix I - Debt-to-Equity Ratio - Mann-Whitney U-Test Results 
All 
Years 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.0658 42 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 347  223  U>CV Accept HO 
0.0788 39 Islamic         Reject HA 
0.5196 15 Islamic          
0.2771 24 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 688  227    
1.3861 3 Conv          
1.4308 1 Conv          
0.3381 21 Conv          
0.2651 25 Conv          
0.0497 43 Conv          
2010 
0.8301 9 Islamic          
0.2830 23 Islamic          
1.4164 2 Islamic          
0.5954 12 Conv          
0.4902 18 Conv          
0.1615 31 Conv          
0.1000 38 Conv          
0.1439 34 Conv          
0.1259 36 Conv          
2011 
0.0201 45 Islamic          
0.4952 17 Islamic          
1.1839 4 Islamic          
0.1139 37 Conv          
0.5630 14 Conv          
0.1580 32 Conv          
0.1659 30 Conv          
0.6107 11 Conv          
0.0710 41 Conv          
2012 
1.0022 8 Islamic          
0.1690 29 Islamic          
0.2415 26 Islamic          
0.2125 27 Conv          
0.3936 19 Conv          
0.5710 13 Conv          
0.3079 22 Conv          
0.3441 20 Conv          
1.1032 7 Conv          
2013 
0.5103 16 Islamic          
0.0392 44 Islamic          
0.1693 28 Islamic          
0.7921 10 Conv          
0.1452 33 Conv          
1.1412 6 Conv          
1.1554 5 Conv          
0.0761 40 Conv          
0.1265 35 Conv          
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Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.0658 8 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 18  6  U>CV Accept HO 
0.0788 7 Islamic          
0.5196 3 Islamic          
0.2771 5 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 27  12    
1.3861 2 Conv          
1.4308 1 Conv          
0.3381 4 Conv          
0.2651 6 Conv          
0.0497 9 Conv          
2010 
0.8301 2 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 8  16    
0.2830 5 Islamic          
1.4164 1 Islamic          
0.5954 3 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 37  2  U>CV Accept HO 
0.4902 4 Conv          
0.1615 6 Conv          
0.1000 9 Conv          
0.1439 7 Conv          
0.1259 8 Conv          
2011 
0.0201 9 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 14  10    
0.4952 4 Islamic          
1.1839 1 Islamic          
0.1139 7 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 31  8  U>CV Accept HO 
0.5630 3 Conv          
0.1580 6 Conv          
0.1659 5 Conv          
0.6107 2 Conv          
0.0710 8 Conv          
2012 
1.0022 2 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 18  6  U>CV Accept HO 
0.1690 9 Islamic          
0.2415 7 Islamic          
0.2125 8 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 27  12    
0.3936 4 Conv          
0.5710 3 Conv          
0.3079 6 Conv          
0.3441 5 Conv          
1.1032 1 Conv          
2013 
0.5103 4 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 18  6  U>CV Accept HO 
0.0392 9 Islamic          
0.1693 5 Islamic          
0.7921 3 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 27  12    
0.1452 6 Conv          
1.1412 2 Conv      
1.1554 1 Conv          
0.0761 8 Conv          
0.1265 7 Conv          
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Appendix J - Loans-to-Assets Ratio - Mann-Whitney U-Test Results 
All 
Years 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.1979 41 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 345  225  U>CV 
Accept HO 
Reject Ha 
0.4490 29 Islamic          
0.4372 32 Islamic          
0.5338 16 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 690  225    
0.5922 4 Conv          
0.5575 7 Conv          
0.5345 15 Conv          
0.3124 40 Conv          
0.5532 10 Conv          
2010 
0.4409 31 Islamic          
0.5274 18 Islamic          
0.6256 3 Islamic          
0.5499 12 Conv          
0.5740 6 Conv          
0.3813 37 Conv          
0.5249 19 Conv          
0.1263 44 Conv          
0.3982 35 Conv          
2011 
0.6384 2 Islamic          
0.5564 8 Islamic          
0.5391 13 Islamic          
0.4169 34 Conv          
0.4677 25 Conv          
0.1212 45 Conv          
0.4588 27 Conv          
0.4352 33 Conv          
0.5002 21 Conv          
2012 
0.5525 11 Islamic          
0.3192 38 Islamic          
0.3910 36 Islamic          
0.1406 43 Conv          
0.4851 23 Conv          
0.4671 26 Conv          
0.5545 9 Conv          
0.4471 30 Conv          
0.4918 22 Conv          
2013 
0.5319 17 Islamic          
0.1635 42 Islamic          
0.4849 24 Islamic          
0.4567 28 Conv          
0.5805 5 Conv          
0.6607 1 Conv          
0.5097 20 Conv          
0.5377 14 Conv          
0.3167 39 Conv          
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Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.1979 9 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 22  2  U=CV Accept HO 
0.4490 6 Islamic          
0.4372 7 Islamic          
0.5338 5 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 23  16    
0.5922 1 Conv          
0.5575 2 Conv          
0.5345 4 Conv          
0.3124 8 Conv          
0.5532 3 Conv          
2010 
0.4409 6 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 11  13    
0.5274 4 Islamic          
0.6256 1 Islamic          
0.5499 3 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 34  5  U>CV Accept HO 
0.5740 2 Conv          
0.3813 8 Conv          
0.5249 5 Conv          
0.1263 9 Conv          
0.3982 7 Conv          
2011 
0.6384 1 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 6  18    
0.5564 2 Islamic          
0.5391 3 Islamic          
0.4169 8 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 39  0  U<CV Reject HO 
0.4677 5 Conv          
0.1212 9 Conv          
0.4588 6 Conv          
0.4352 7 Conv          
0.5002 4 Conv          
2012 
0.5525 2 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 17  7  U>CV Accept HO 
0.3192 8 Islamic          
0.3910 7 Islamic          
0.1406 9 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 28  11    
0.4851 4 Conv          
0.4671 5 Conv          
0.5545 1 Conv          
0.4471 6 Conv          
0.4918 3 Conv          
2013 
0.5319 4 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 19  5  U>CV Accept HO 
0.1635 9 Islamic          
0.4849 6 Islamic          
0.4567 7 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 26  13    
0.5805 2 Conv          
0.6607 1 Conv      
0.5097 5 Conv          
0.5377 3 Conv          
0.3167 8 Conv          
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Appendix K - Loans-to-Deposits Ratio - Mann-Whitney U-Test Results 
All 
Years 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.2151 41 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 352  218  U>CV Accept HO 
0.5272 29 Islamic         Reject HA 
0.4999 34 Islamic          
0.6489 15 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 683  232    
0.6717 13 Conv          
0.7837 1 Conv          
0.6566 14 Conv          
0.3848 39 Conv          
0.6434 18 Conv          
2010 
0.5055 32 Islamic          
0.6397 19 Islamic          
0.6877 10 Islamic          
0.6959 7 Conv          
0.7051 5 Conv          
0.4713 35 Conv          
0.6023 21 Conv          
0.1454 44 Conv          
0.4677 36 Conv          
2011 
0.6797 11 Islamic          
0.6938 8 Islamic          
0.7267 3 Islamic          
0.5150 30 Conv          
0.5419 27 Conv          
0.1378 45 Conv          
0.5480 25 Conv          
0.5110 31 Conv          
0.6011 22 Conv          
2012 
0.7076 4 Islamic          
0.3866 38 Islamic          
0.4375 37 Islamic          
0.1583 43 Conv          
0.5807 23 Conv          
0.5441 26 Conv          
0.6922 9 Conv          
0.5015 33 Conv          
0.6454 17 Conv          
2013 
0.6120 20 Islamic          
0.1797 42 Islamic          
0.5774 24 Islamic          
0.5357 28 Conv          
0.7022 6 Conv          
0.7354 2 Conv          
0.6776 12 Conv          
0.6486 16 Conv          
0.3788 40 Conv          
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Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.2151 9 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 22  2  U>CV Accept HO 
0.5272 6 Islamic          
0.4999 7 Islamic          
0.6489 4 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 23  16    
0.6717 2 Conv          
0.7837 1 Conv          
0.6566 3 Conv          
0.3848 8 Conv          
0.6434 5 Conv          
2010 
0.5055 6 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 13  11    
0.6397 4 Islamic          
0.6877 3 Islamic          
0.6959 2 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 32  7  U>CV Accept HO 
0.7051 1 Conv          
0.4713 7 Conv          
0.6023 5 Conv          
0.1454 9 Conv          
0.4677 8 Conv          
2011 
0.6797 3 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 6  18    
0.6938 2 Islamic          
0.7267 1 Islamic          
0.5150 7 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 39  0  U<CV Reject HO 
0.5419 6 Conv          
0.1378 9 Conv          
0.5480 5 Conv          
0.5110 8 Conv          
0.6011 4 Conv          
2012 
0.7076 1 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 16  8  U>CV Accept HO 
0.3866 8 Islamic          
0.4375 7 Islamic          
0.1583 9 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 29  10    
0.5807 4 Conv          
0.5441 5 Conv          
0.6922 2 Conv          
0.5015 6 Conv          
0.6454 3 Conv          
2013 
0.6120 5 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 20  4  U>CV Accept HO 
0.1797 9 Islamic          
0.5774 6 Islamic          
0.5357 7 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 25  14    
0.7022 2 Conv          
0.7354 1 Conv       
0.6776 3 Conv          
0.6486 4 Conv          
0.3788 8 Conv          
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Appendix L - TENL Ratio - Mann-Whitney U-Test Results 
All 
Years 
Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results  
2009 
0.0880 41 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 442  128  U<CV Reject HO  
0.2130 16 Islamic           
0.0902 39 Islamic           
0.1940 19 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 593  322     
0.1017 38 Conv           
0.2237 13 Conv           
0.1665 25 Conv           
0.2369 12 Conv           
0.1181 36 Conv           
2010 
0.1702 24 Islamic           
0.1659 26 Islamic           
0.0678 44 Islamic           
0.2005 18 Conv           
0.1599 28 Conv           
0.2419 9 Conv           
0.1293 34 Conv           
0.3615 2 Conv           
0.2382 11 Conv           
2011 
0.0662 45 Islamic           
0.1912 22 Islamic           
0.1434 32 Islamic           
0.2792 6 Conv           
0.1167 37 Conv           
0.5252 1 Conv           
0.2185 15 Conv           
0.1456 31 Conv           
0.2408 10 Conv           
2012 
0.1554 29 Islamic           
0.2676 8 Islamic           
0.0892 40 Islamic           
0.3156 3 Conv           
0.1914 21 Conv           
0.1309 33 Conv           
0.2072 17 Conv           
0.0838 42 Conv           
0.2761 7 Conv           
2013 
0.1217 35 Islamic           
0.1645 27 Islamic           
0.2225 14 Islamic           
0.1494 30 Conv           
0.1938 20 Conv           
0.0734 43 Conv           
0.2835 4 Conv           
0.1795 23 Conv           
0.2801 5 Conv           
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Year Score Rank Sample   Test Statistic  U-Value  Interpret Results 
2009 
0.0880 9 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 20  4  U>CV Accept HO 
0.2130 3 Islamic          
0.0902 8 Islamic          
0.1940 4 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 25  14    
0.1017 7 Conv          
0.2237 2 Conv          
0.1665 5 Conv          
0.2369 1 Conv          
0.1181 6 Conv          
2010 
0.1702 5 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 20  4  U>CV Accept HO 
0.1659 6 Islamic          
0.0678 9 Islamic          
0.2005 4 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 25  14    
0.1599 7 Conv          
0.2419 2 Conv          
0.1293 8 Conv          
0.3615 1 Conv          
0.2382 3 Conv          
2011 
0.0662 9 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 21  3  U>CV Accept HO 
0.1912 5 Islamic          
0.1434 7 Islamic          
0.2792 2 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 24  15    
0.1167 8 Conv          
0.5252 1 Conv          
0.2185 4 Conv          
0.1456 6 Conv          
0.2408 3 Conv          
2012 
0.1554 6 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 17  7  U>CV Accept HO 
0.2676 3 Islamic          
0.0892 8 Islamic          
0.3156 1 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 28  11    
0.1914 5 Conv          
0.1309 7 Conv          
0.2072 4 Conv          
0.0838 9 Conv          
0.2761 2 Conv          
2013 
0.1217 8 Islamic  ∑ RI Islamic: 17  7  U>CV Accept HO 
0.1645 6 Islamic          
0.2225 3 Islamic          
0.1494 7 Conv  ∑ RC Conv: 28  11    
0.1938 4 Conv          
0.0734 9 Conv       
0.2835 1 Conv          
0.1795 5 Conv          
0.2801 2 Conv          
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Analysis…  Interpret Results 
MeanU 225  0.1 Weak 
σ 41.53312  0.3 Moderate 
Z-score -0.313  0.5 Strong 
     
ES 0.04666  Weak  
 
 




Analysis…   
 MeanU 9   
 σ 3.872983   
 Z-score -0.5164   
2009     
 ES 0.172133  Weak 
     
     
 Z-score -0.7746   
2010     
 ES 0.258199  Moderate 
     
     
 Z-score -0.7746   
2011     
 ES 0.258199  Moderate 
     
     
 Z-score -0.5164   
2012     
 ES 0.172133  Weak 
     
     
 Z-score -1.54919   
2013     
 ES 0.516398  Strong 
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Appendix N - Operating Efficiency Ratio – Effect Size Results 
All Years 
 
Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
MeanU 225  Scale 0 to 1 
σ 41.53312    
Z-score -0.21669    
     
ES 0.032303  Weak  
 
Year by Year 
 
 Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
 MeanU 9  Scale 0 to 1 
 σ 3.872983    
 Z-score -0.7746    
2009      
 ES 0.258199  Moderate 
      
      
 Z-score 0    
2010      
 ES 0  Weak  
      
      
 Z-score -0.5164    
2011      
 ES 0.172133  Weak  
      
      
 Z-score -1.54919    
2012      
 ES 0.516398  Strong  
      
      
 Z-score -0.2582    
2013      
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Appendix O - CAR – Effect Size Results 
All Years 
 
Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
MeanU 225  Scale 0 to 1 
σ 41.53312    
Z-score -1.54094    
     
ES 0.22971  Weak to Moderate 
 
Year by Year 
 
 Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
 MeanU 9  Scale 0 to 1 
 σ 3.872983    
 Z-score -1.29099    
2009      
 ES 0.430331  Moderate 
      
      
      
 Z-score -1.54919    
2010      
 ES 0.516398  Strong  
      
      
 Z-score -0.2582    
2011      
 ES 0.086066  Weak  
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.5164    
2012      
 ES 0.172133  Weak  
     
      
      
 Z-score -0.7746    
2013      
 ES 0.258199  Moderate 
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Appendix P - ROA Ratio – Effect Size Results 
All Years 
Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
MeanU 225  Scale 0 to 1 
σ 41.53312    
Z-score -0.24077    
     
ES 0.035892  Weak  
 
Year by Year 
  
 Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
 MeanU 9  Scale 0 to 1 
 σ 3.872983    
 Z-score -1.0328    
2009      
 ES 0.344265  Moderate 
      
      
 Z-score -0.5164    
2010      
 ES 0.172133  Weak  
      
      
 Z-score -1.0328    
2011      
 ES 0.344265  Moderate 
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.2582    
2012      
 ES 0.086066  Weak  
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.5164    
2013      
 ES 0.172133  Weak  
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Appendix Q - ROE Ratio – Effect Size Results 
All Years 
Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
MeanU 225  Scale 0 to 1 
σ 41.53312    
Z-score -0.02408    
     
ES 0.003589  Weak  
 
Year by Year 
  
 Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
 MeanU 9  Scale 0 to 1 
 σ 3.872983    
 Z-score -1.29099    
2009      
 ES 0.430331  Moderate 
      
      
 Z-score -0.2582    
2010      
 ES 0.086066  Weak  
      
      
 Z-score -1.0328    
2011      
 ES 0.344265  Moderate 
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.5164    
2012      
 ES 0.172133  Weak  
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.7746    
2013      
 ES 0.258199  Moderate 
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Appendix R - NPM Ratio – Effect Size Results 
All Years 
Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
MeanU 225  Scale 0 to 1 
σ 41.53312    
Z-score -0.02408    
     
ES 0.003589  Weak  
 
Year by Year 
  
 Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
 MeanU 9  Scale 0 to 1 
 σ 3.872983    
 Z-score -1.0328    
2009      
 ES 0.344265  Moderate 
      
      
 Z-score -0.2582    
2010      
 ES 0.086066  Weak  
      
      
 Z-score -0.7746    
2011      
 ES 0.258199  Moderate 
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.2582    
2012      
 ES 0.086066  Weak  
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.7746    
2013      
 ES 0.258199  Moderate 
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Appendix S - NIM Ratio – Effect Size Results 
All Years 
Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
MeanU 225  Scale 0 to 1 
σ 41.53312    
Z-score -0.38523    
     
ES 0.057427  Weak  
 
Year by Year 
  
 Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
 MeanU 9  Scale 0 to 1 
 σ 3.872983    
 Z-score -0.5164    
2009      
 ES 0.172133  Weak  
      
      
 Z-score -1.29099    
2010      
 ES 0.430331  Moderate 
      
      
 Z-score -1.0328    
2011      
 ES 0.344265  Moderate 
      
      
      
 Z-score -1.80739    
2012      
 ES 0.602464  Strong  
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.7746    
2013      
 ES 0.258199  Moderate 
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Appendix T - Debt-to-Equity Ratio – Effect Size Results 
All Years 
Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
MeanU 225  Scale 0 to 1 
σ 41.53312    
Z-score -0.04815    
     
ES 0.007178  Weak  
 
Year by Year 
  
 Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
 MeanU 9  Scale 0 to 1 
 σ 3.872983    
 Z-score -0.7746    
2009      
 ES 0.258199  Moderate 
      
      
 Z-score -1.80739    
2010      
 ES 0.602464  Strong  
      
      
 Z-score -0.2582    
2011      
 ES 0.086066  Weak  
      
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.7746    
2012      
 ES 0.258199  Moderate 
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.7746    
2013      
 ES 0.258199  Moderate 
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Appendix U - Loans-to-Assets Ratio – Effect Size Results 
All Years 
Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
MeanU 225  Scale 0 to 1 
σ 41.53312    
Z-score 0    
     
ES 0  Weak  
 
Year by Year 
  
 Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
 MeanU 9  Scale 0 to 1 
 σ 3.872983    
 Z-score -1.80739    
2009      
 ES 0.602464  Strong  
      
      
 Z-score -1.0328    
2010      
 ES 0.344265  Moderate 
      
      
 Z-score -2.32379    
2011      
 ES 0.774597  Strong  
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.5164    
2012      
 ES 0.172133  Weak  
      
      
      
 Z-score -1.0328    
2013      
 ES 0.344265  Moderate 
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Appendix V - Loans-to-Deposits Ratio – Effect Size Results 
All Years 
Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
MeanU 225  Scale 0 to 1 
σ 41.53312    
Z-score -0.16854    
     
ES 0.025124  Weak  
 
Year by Year 
  
 Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
 MeanU 9  Scale 0 to 1 
 σ 3.872983    
 Z-score -1.80739    
2009      
 ES 0.602464  Strong  
      
      
 Z-score -0.5164    
2010      
 ES 0.172133  Weak  
      
      
 Z-score -2.32379    
2011      
 ES 0.774597  Strong  
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.2582    
2012      
 ES 0.086066  Weak  
      
      
      
 Z-score -1.29099    
2013      
 ES 0.430331  Moderate 
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Appendix W - TENL Ratio – Effect Size Results 
All Years 
Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
MeanU 225  Scale 0 to 1 
σ 41.53312    
Z-score -2.33549    
     
ES 0.348154  Moderate  
 
Year by Year 
  
 Effect Size Analysis  Interpret Results 
 MeanU 9  Scale 0 to 1 
 σ 3.872983    
 Z-score -1.29099    
2009      
 ES 0.430331  Moderate 
      
      
 Z-score -1.29099    
2010      
 ES 0.430331  Moderate 
      
      
 Z-score -1.54919    
2011      
 ES 0.516398  Strong  
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.5164    
2012      
 ES 0.172133  Weak  
      
      
      
 Z-score -0.5164    
2013      
 ES 0.172133  Weak  
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